In international business relationships, such as international railway operations, large amounts of data can be exchanged among the parties involved. For the exchange of such data, a limited risk of being cheated by another party, e.g., by being provided with fake data, as well as reasonable cost and a foreseeable benefit, is expected. As the exchanged data can be used to make critical business decisions, there is a high incentive for one party to manipulate the data in its favor. To prevent this type of manipulation, mechanisms exist to ensure the integrity and authenticity of the data. In combination with a fair exchange protocol, it can be ensured that the integrity and authenticity of this data is maintained even when it is exchanged with another party. At the same time, such a protocol ensures that the exchange of data only takes place in conjunction with the agreed compensation, such as a payment, and that the payment is only made if the integrity and authenticity of the data is ensured as previously agreed. However, in order to be able to guarantee fairness, a fair exchange protocol must involve a trusted third party. To avoid fraud by a single centralized party acting as a trusted third party, current research proposes decentralizing the trusted third party, e.g., by using a distributed ledger based fair exchange protocol. However, for assessing the fairness of such an exchange, state-of-the-art approaches neglect costs arising for the parties conducting the fair exchange. This can result in a violation of the outlined expectation of reasonable cost, especially when distributed ledgers are involved, which are typically associated with non-negligible costs. Furthermore, the performance of typical distributed ledger-based fair exchange protocols is limited, posing an obstacle to widespread adoption. To overcome the challenges, in this thesis, we introduce the foundation for a data exchange platform allowing for a fully decentralized fair data exchange with reasonable cost and performance. As a theoretical foundation, we introduce the concept of cost fairness, which considers cost for the fairness assessment by requesting that a party following the fair exchange protocol never suffers any unilateral disadvantages. We prove that cost fairness cannot be achieved using typical public distributed ledgers but requires customized distributed ledger instances, which usually lack complete decentralization. However, we show that the highest unilateral cost are caused by a grieving attack. To allow fair data exchanges to be conducted with reasonable cost and performance, we introduce FairSCE, a distributed ledger-based fair exchange protocol using distributed ledger state channels and incorporating a mechanism to protect against grieving attacks, reducing the possible unilateral cost that have to be covered to a minimum. Based on our evaluation of FairSCE, the worst-case cost for data exchange, even in the presence of malicious parties, is known, which allows an estimate of the possible benefit and, thus, the preliminary estimate of economic utility. Furthermore, to allow for an unambiguous assessment of the correct data being transferred while still allowing for sensitive parts of the data to be masked, we introduce an approach for the hashing of hierarchically structured data, which can be used to ensure integrity and authenticity of the data being transferred.