Das Ziel der Dissertation besteht in der Erklärung und Analyse grundlegender Steuerungsmuster zwischen Politik und Universitätssystem in den nationalen Bologna-Prozessen in Deutschland, Österreich und der Schweiz: Wurde die Studienreform primär staatlich verordnet, im Dialog mit den Hochschulen implementiert oder die Ausgestaltung der Reform der Wissenschaft weitgehend überlassen - und welche Instrumente wurden dabei weshalb genutzt? Damit schließt die Arbeit an den aktuellen Forschungsstand zu vertikalen Vermittlungsprozessen (übernational-national) im Bologna-Prozess an: Nationale Hochschulsysteme konvergieren nicht zu einem einheitlichen Modell, sondern nationale Faktoren (z.B. Problemdeutungen und Einflussmöglichkeiten von Bildungspolitik, Universitäten u.a.) führen dazu, dass Bologna jeweils länderspezifisch verstanden und interpretiert wird. Vor diesem Hintergrund wird im theoretischen Teil zur Anleitung eines systematischen Vergleichs ein analytischer Rahmen entworfen, dessen Elemente sowohl aus der Politikwissenschaft (Instrumenteforschung, Politische Steuerung, Governance etc.) als auch aus der Hochschulforschung stammen. In den anschließenden empirischen Kapiteln zu den drei Ländern werden die Akteurkonstellationen und faktisch zu beobachtenden Instrumentarien beschrieben, analysiert und interpretiert. Die methodische Basis bilden neben der Analyse zahlreicher Dokumente 37 leitfadengestützte Interviews mit Expertinnen und Experten. Grundsätzlich lassen sich auf Basis der empirischen Teile die folgenden zentralen Ergebnisse der Studie festhalten: Deutschland: Aufgrund der relativ starken Kompetenzen der Länder und der Einflussschwäche der Universitäten ist für den deutschen Bologna-Prozess ein primär interventionistisches Muster kennzeichnend. Dieses wurde und wird bis heute dadurch verstärkt, dass die Umsetzung von Bologna durch spezifische Problemwahrnehmungen und -lösungen von KMK und HRK in den 90er Jahren geprägt ist (z.B. Modularisierung als Antwort auf unstrukturierte Studiengänge, Akkreditierung als Fortführung der tradierten Input-Steuerung). `Bologna` wurde so mit genuin nationalen Instrumenten verquickt, die z.T. quer zum tradierten Lehrhabitus vieler Hochschullehrerinnen und -lehrer lag und liegt (z.B. Modularisierung oder Kompetenzorientierung). Verstärkend trat hinzu, dass die Reform u.a. aufgrund des Bund/Länder-Konflikts in der Bildungspolitik im Vorfeld der Föderalismusreform I nicht finanziell unterstützt wurde. Plastisch formuliert ist der deutsche Bologna-Prozess regulativ über- und finanziell untersteuert, was auch zu den Studierendenprotesten 2009/2010 beitrug. Österreich: Der Bologna-Prozess lief in Österreich parallel zu einem umfassenden Neuordnungsprozess, innerhalb dessen die Universitäten in ihrer Autonomie erheblich gestärkt wurden und sich das zuvor zentrale Wissenschaftsministerium in seinen Kompetenzen erheblich limitierte. Dieses hatte die Reform unmittelbar 1999 noch angestoßen, zog sich anschließend jedoch im Rahmen einer `minimalen Steuerung` zurück und übernahm auch keine Reformmehrkosten. Da unterhalb der in die Autonomie entlassenen Universitäten kein nationaler Dialog über die Reform in Gang kommen konnte, fand der Bologna-Prozess vor allem auf der Ebene der jeweils eigenständigen Universitäten `vor Ort` statt. Diese erhebliche regulative und finanzielle Untersteuerung führte 2009/2010 zu massiven Studierendenprotesten, die angesichts der schwachen Position des Ministeriums auch nur unzureichend kanalisiert werden konnten. Schweiz: In der Schweiz hingegen ist eine austarierte regulative und finanzielle Steuerung zu beobachten. Bund und Kantone übertrugen Anfang der 2000er Jahre wenige, aber wesentliche Kompetenzen auf ein gemeinsames Organ, das seinerseits per Gesetz eng mit der Rektorenkonferenz zusammenarbeiten sollte. Bologna stärkte dieses bis dato auf dem Papier bestehende Muster: Vor dem Hintergrund einer übergreifend geteilten prozessualen Subsidiaritätsnorm sowie weitgehender Präferenzenübereinstimmung zwischen Politik und Universitäten finanzierte der Staat gezielt die Reformmehrkosten sowie strategische Projekte und delegiert die Formulierung, Implementierung und Weiterentwicklung zentraler Vorgaben auf der Basis des Entscheidungsvorbehalts an die Rektorenkonferenz bzw. Universitäten. Probleme werden innerhalb dieses Arrangements z.T. identifiziert und bearbeitet. Die Politik greift nur subsidiär im Ausnahmefall ein. Die Schweiz kommt daher dem Idealtypus der strukturierenden Steuerung sehr nahe. Die Befunde werden abschließend in einen größeren Bezugsrahmen eingeordnet, um sie über Bologna hinaus für die Analyse des deutschen Hochschulsystems fruchtbar zu machen. Maßstab hierfür sind ausgewählte normative Kriterien zur Güte von Steuerungsmustern. So wird z.B. gezielt die politische Entscheidungskapazität in den beobachteten Mustern betrachtet: Während etwa in Deutschland auf die Studierendenproteste 2009 im Rahmen des interventionistischen Musters mit verbindlichen Instrumenten wie Strukturvorgaben, Akkreditierung und letztlich dem Qualitätspakt Lehre nicht nur symbolisch reagiert werden konnte, stand das Wiener Wissenschaftsministerium den starken Protesten durch den Verzicht auf regulative und finanzielle Ressourcen hilflos gegenüber. Auf dieser Basis werden abschließend einige grundlegende Anregungen zur Weiterentwicklung des deutschen Hochschulsystems gegeben. Unter anderem wird dafür plädiert, den hochschulpolitischen Reformdiskurs, der sich oftmals nur zwischen den Polen `mehr Staat` und `mehr Wettbewerb` zu bewegen scheint, gezielt um alternative Handlungslogiken und Akteure zu erweitern: Die Ergebnisse der Arbeit legen nahe, Verbände und Organisationen (Rektorenkonferenzen, Fachgesellschaften, Fakultätentage u.a.) politisch zu stärken, um diese Sichtweisen und Expertisen in zukünftigen Reformprozessen (z.B. aktuell Digitalisierung) systematischer als zuvor miteinzubeziehen. Denn eine zu starke Entkopplung von politischen und wissenschaftlichen Rationalitäten führt unweigerlich zu nicht intendierten Effekten, die ihrerseits wieder Handlungsdruck erzeugen (z.B. Proteste).

Successful export sectors in manufacturing and agribusiness are important drivers of structural transformation in Sub-Sahara African countries. Backed by industrial policies and active state involvement, a small number of successful productive export sectors has emerged in Sub-Saharan Africa. This thesis asks the question: How do politics shape the promotion of export-driven industrialisation and firm-level upgrading in Sub-Saharan Africa? It exemplifies this question with an in-depth, qualitative study of the cashew processing industry in Mozambique in the period from 1991 until 2019. Mozambique used to be one of the world’s largest producers and processors of cashew nuts in the 1960s and 1970s. At the end of the 20th century, the cashew processing industry broke down completely but has re-emerged as one of the country’s few successful agro-processing exports. The thesis draws on theoretical approaches from the fields of political science, notably the political settlements framework, global value chain analysis and the research on technological capabilities to explore why the Mozambican Government supported the cashew processing industry and how Mozambican cashew processors acquired the technological capabilities needed to access the global cashew value chain and to upgrade. It makes an important theoretical contribution by linking the political settlements framework and the literature on upgrading in global value chains to study how politics shaped productive sector promotion and upgrading in the Mozambican cashew processing industry. The findings of the thesis are based on extensive primary data, including 58 expert interviews and 10 firm surveys, that was collected in Mozambique in 2018 as well as a broad base of secondary literature. The thesis argues that the Mozambican Government supported the cashew processing industry because it became important for the Government’s political survival. Promoting the cashew sector formed part of an electoral strategy for the ruling FRELIMO coalition and a means to keep FRELIMO factions united by offering economic opportunities to key constituencies. In 1999, it adopted a protectionist cashew law that created strong incentives for cashew processing in Mozambique. This not only facilitated the re-emergence of the cashew processing industry after its breakdown. The law and the active involvement of the National Cashew Institute (INCAJU) also affected the governance of the local cashew value chain, the creation of backward linkages, and the upgrading paths of cashew processors. The findings of the thesis suggest that the cashew law reduced the pressure on the cashew processing industry to upgrade. The law further created opportunities for formal and informal rent creation for members of the political elite and lower level FRELIMO officials that prevented a far-reaching reform of the law. The thesis shows that international buyers do not promote upgrading among Sub-Sahara African firms in global value chains with market-based or modular governance. Moreover, firms that operate in countries where industrial policies are not enforced effectively cannot draw on the support of government institutions to enhance their capabilities and to upgrade. Firms therefore mainly depended on costly learning channels at firm level, e.g. learning by doing or hiring skilled labour, and/or on technical assistance from donors to build the technological capabilities needed to access global value chains and to remain competitive. The findings of the thesis suggest that researchers, governments, development practitioners and consultants need to rethink their understanding of upgrading in GVCs in four ways. First, they need to move away from understanding upgrading in terms of moving towards more complex, higher value-added activities in GVCs (functional upgrading). Instead, it is important to consider the potential of other, more realistic types of upgrading for firms in low-income countries, such reducing risks by diversifying suppliers and buyers or increasing rewards by making production processes more efficient. Second, they need to replace an overly positive view on upgrading that neglects possible side-effects at sector and/or country level. Third, GVC participation on its own does not promote upgrading among local supplier firms in Sub-Saharan Africa. The interests of lead firms and Sub-Sahara African supplier firms may not be aligned or even conflicting. Targeted industrial policies and the creation of institutions that effectively promote capability building among firms therefore become even more important. Finally, upgrading needs to be understood as a process that is not only shaped by interactions between firms, but also by local domestic politics. The findings of the thesis are highly relevant for scholars from the fields of political science, development studies, and economics. Its practical implications and tools, e.g. a technological capabilities matrix for the cashew industry, are of interest for development practitioners, members of public institutions in Sub-Sahara African countries, local entrepreneurs, and representatives of local business associations that are involved in promoting export sectors and upgrading among local firms.

Aims and findings of the dissertation The completed research uses holistic, politological and historical approaches to present how, during the studied period of the administrations of Clinton to Obama, the liberal, rule-based world order system is gradually supplemented and replaced by a system of realist imposition of vital interests that have short-term effects, preferring military means combined with continuous military optimisation. This also explains a continuity between the leading-power policy of administrations in this study (1993-2017) and the subsequent period of the “transactional leadership of Trump”(1), with its recognizable, far-reaching effects of aiming to reduce idealistic Grand Strategy elements and measures of a benevolent order by passing on costs to and reducing the benefits of European NATO allies. The results of this dissertation, such as the increasingly evident dissolution of a multilateral fundamental order, therefore indicate that Trump’s foreign and security policy to date should be regarded as a clearly noticeable crisis symptom, rather than the cause of a decline in the world order established after 1945. This decline is synonymous with the erosion of the transatlantically initiated bipolar “American system”. Its implementation was the result of the “lesson of two world wars”, based on modern concepts of order introduced by the Enlightenment and the founding criteria of the United States: thus its dissolution is also an indicator of the failure of contemporary criteria of order that thrive in the “American way of life”. The cause of the described development is shown to be a constantly exacerbating overall threat, from Clinton to Obama, which is connected to the consistent erosion of US supremacy. Among other aspects, this is based on climate change effects postulated in 1979, which multiply the threat while coinciding with American peak production of fossil fuels and increased demand on resources in the context of dwindling raw material resources. Furthermore, during the period of this study, the “US conservative revolution”, which began in the 1980s, increasingly affected foreign and security policy, combining with a consolidation in the influence of corporations and lobby groups in fields such as policy implementation and new underlying conditions. They include the onset of digitisation, entailing a high consumption of resources, and a growing world population faced with specific demographic indicators. Additionally, the maintenance of the armaments sector, originally a result of bipolar development, as the economic basis of military supremacy and the slow decline of the Dollar hegemony since around 1973, should also be taken into account. Complex interaction between Grand Strategy implementation according to the premise of expanding US-American dominance under neoconservative and Christian Right-wing influences, as well as asymmetrical and reactivated conventional security threats and threat multipliers clearly indicate the linear development of the overall threat in the period between 1993 and 2017: in the context of Grand Strategy statements, above all the understanding of defence against this threat, of the latter’s multiplying factors and the market economy explains the following with respect to the US far-right in a complex interaction with the growth of transnational corporations, lobby groups, individuals(2), informal networks and state actors with respect to objects of threat and threat multipliers(3) in connection with the post-bipolar, global anchoring of US economic and consumer patterns: US adaptation of its reaction to this threat – while consolidating imperial presidency(4) and weakening the system of checks and balances – including its implications of a bipolar liberal order. In this way, the necessary continued leadership within NATO through the US-proposed NATO reform can be seen as an appropriate implementation of transformed threat-reaction measures and the legitimisation of systemic adaptation. It equally becomes clear that the established threat reaction measures only provide a short-term defence: instead, they enhance the asymmetric and conventional threat, as well as threat multipliers – by introducing arms races and breaking down arms control – thereby heightening the overall threat. The consequence is the consistently growing likelihood of a conflict of hitherto unimaginable proportions. At the same time, the urgent need to mobilise transatlantic cooperation with respect to supporting global cooperation between state and non-government actors is illustrated with respect to the roots of the threat and its deteriorating underlying conditions: each increase in the overall threat, the adapted US security policy and its continuation in NATO is connected to an erosion of rule-based underlying criteria during the studied period. This continuously and consistently undermines the basis of the above-stated, ever-increasingly important cooperation, to prevent or at least limit the successive erosion of the bipolar “American system” under future dystopias. The research results completely overturn the state of research to date, since for instance it is possible to show that, by means of NATO transformation findings, no transatlantic sharing of burdens on an equal footing and no NATO reform in accordance with its founding principles can be achieved. The same also applies to European opposition to the actual anchoring of NATO transformation positions(5), which is based on the erosion of the bipolar liberal order system and the maintenance of US advantages as well as the consolidation of particular interests they facilitate. Furthermore, it is apparent that a line of continuity in the threat-reaction measures from Clinton to Obama exists with varying external effects, along with an underlying pattern of “Battleship America” – as opposed to a multilaterally orientated foreign and security policy under Clinton, which merged into a unilateral, radical swing under G. W. Bush 43 following 9/11, but was reverted by the Obama administration. A comprehensive wealth of literature was used of the doctoral thesis, as reflected by the extensive bibliography: they firstly include diverse American and European publications, monographs and relevant secondary literature, including biographies, publications of various kinds of important political planning and implementation, as well as collected volumes and research articles from specialist journals on all fields of research and politological methodology and theory. The same applies to publications by leading European and American institutions, research centres and think tanks. Furthermore, this author used publications and documents by governments, foreign ministries, defence ministries, other government bodies and Nato. Dissertation structure This dissertation is divided into two volumes and one Appendix: Volume 1 discusses Focus 1, namely a process-tracing in the context of offensive neorealist positioning. Volume 2 presents Focus 2, which is based on the preceding focus in making a structured, focussed comparison in the context of defensive neorealist positioning. The Appendix volume contains further discussion of Chapter 1, Volume 1 with respect to the state of research, literature and sources, theoretical positioning and the choice of the region of study and selected European NATO partners. Furthermore, a historical chapter provides underlying information for process-tracing in Chapter 2, Volume 1, an index of images and abbreviations, and a bibliography. The entire dissertation uses qualitative methods to focus on these two mutually supporting, building on each other, themes to investigate the following from a US-perspective: firstly the overriding US security-policy reaction to a new overall threat and secondly, its continuation combined with the opportunity of for enabling and legitimising it within and through NATO during the studied period from Clinton to Obama. Based on the first part of this hypothesis, Focus 1 (Volume 1) establishes a connection between, on the one hand, maintaining the bipolar Grand Strategy target of consolidating the USA as a leading, regulating power, bipolar foreign-policy Grand Strategy indicators and a new overall threat that is developing in a complex way, and, on the other, the necessity of its continued leadership within NATO and the required NATO transformation according to US-proposed NATO transformation positions. Focus 2 (Volume 2) is based on the second part of the hypothesis, investigating the transatlantic negotiation process to establish these US-proposed NATO transformation positions: in this context, Volume 2 investigates whether the attempt to actually secure and consolidate such US supremacy was unsuccessful in the face of resistance from selected European NATO partners, namely France, Germany and the United Kingdom. The overall result shows that due to a complex, developing, linear increase in the overall threat, the chance for the USA to consolidate its status as a leading power is steadily diminishing. This must be compensated by adapting US security policy. The resulting American security-policy realignment based on the initiated “revolution in military affairs” in turn modifies the indicators of bipolar collective security guarantees. Everything is enabled and legitimised by means of actually securing US NATO-transformation positions. The actual implementation of such NATO transformation – representing the consistent adaptation of US security policy – enables a mission-orientated, rapid response, flexible, global security projection. It also creates conditions for “alliances of choice” within NATO. Furthermore, the modification of a “bipolar NATO” exacerbates the erosion of key achievements of civilisation as a result of adapted US security policy, as well as undermining the tasks of bipolar collective security guarantees through diminished benefits to European NATO partners. The actual anchoring of NATO transformation positions is achieved by reactivating the conventional threat in the context of the Ukraine crisis of 2014 and the extension of NATO partnership rings on a global level, without providing them with NATO membership status, thus avoiding globalisation in a mutual defence case. The German and French resistance is particularly intensive through the involvement of European founder states, while the formation of a European leadership triumvirate consisting of France, Germany and the United Kingdom does not take place. Moreover, a relevant investigation of causes particularly shows that despite constant mutually supporting US security reaction measures with varying international effects and actual continued leadership within NATO, the overall threat is not receding: this leads to a constant increase in the overall threat, a loss of influence of state actors, the diffusion and concentration of power and the increased probability of reactive conventional, nuclear, cyber and ecological destruction scenarios. On this basis, the consequence is an increasingly comprehensive and rapidly responding precision defence combined with growing securitization to compensate for the ongoing containment of US supremacy. This developing process steadily diminishes the reach and power of a liberal, rule-based, bipolar “American system” and the establishment of “idealistic, liberal” elements of US-Grand Strategy. This entails a further reduction in benefits for European NATO allies and increasing US cost-cutting demands – based on the successive NATO transformation positions that build on each other and Obama’s “smart power”(6) during the period studied in this dissertation. Thus the chance is receding of developing the post-bipolar, globally adopted American way of life with individual national character, which is regarded as “non-negotiable”: for instance its articulation is expressed through increasing right-wing populism, the election of outsider-candidates, the dissolution of traditional party systems, isolationist tendencies combined with burgeoning ethnic, regional movements, the rejection of supranationalism, and religious fundamentalism. At the same time, the ongoing erosion of global public goods is apparent. This all paves the way to limiting the benevolent American regulating power and state actors’ leverage – and therefore to a return to classic power politics in the context of a resulting diffusion and concentration of power. In view of the urgency of a long-term containment of asymmetrical or conventional threats to security, or aspects that exacerbate such threats or clusters thereof, as well as underlying global conditions, this undermines the ability to achieve the following: to achieve transatlantic cooperation by broadening the range of levels and actors in the spirit of proactive and expanded, networked security to achieve according global cooperation with respect to containing the root causes of threats. Overall, this research work reveals how and why the anticipated “peace dividend” and the notion of an “age of hope”, as postulated by President Clinton, were hardly perceptible during the period of study between 1993 and 2017. Notes (1) Cf. Braml, Josef (2018), Trumps transaktionaler Transatlantizismus, in: Jäger, Thomas (Hrsg.), Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, Oktober 2018, Volume 11, Ausgabe 4, S. 439-448, Wiesbaden. (2) Cf. National Intelligence Council (Ed.) (2012), Global Trends 2013: Alternative Worlds (NIC 2012-001), https://publicintelligence.net/global-trends-2030/, last accessed: 12.04.19. See also the “international financial leadership, self-selected at Davos” cit. McCoy, Alfred W. (2017), In the Shadows of the American Century. The Rise and Decline of US Global Power, Chicago. (3) In 1990, the threat-enhancing nature of climate change was already postulated with respect to asymmetric objects of threat as well as conventional and complex clusters: “Over the next half century, the global average temperature may increase by approximately 4 degrees C. (…) All nations will be affected. (…) How much time will there be to confirm the amount of change and then to act? (…) However, many believe that we will have waited too long to avoid major dislocation, hardship and conflict – on a scale not as yet seen by man“. Cf. Kelley, Terry P. (1990), Global Climate Change. Implications For The United States Navy (The United States Naval War College, Newport, RI), http://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/weather/climatechange/globalclimatechange-navy.pdf, last accessed: 30.03.19. Cf. Mazo, Jeffrey (2010), Climate Conflict. How global warming threatens security and what to do about it, London, Abingdon. This supports the thesis of a developing, constant overall threat during the period between 1993 and 2017. (4) Cf. Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. (1973), The Imperial Presidency, Boston. (5) In this dissertation, the proposed US positions on NATO adaptation, the NATO Response Force and the Global Partnership Initiative are described as “NATO transformation positions”: Their actual establishment was connected to a NATO transformation with the consistent continuation of adapted US security policy. (6) Cf. Nossel, Suzanne (2004), Smart Power. Reclaiming Liberal Internationalism, http://www.democracyarsenal.org/SmartPowerFA.pdf, last accessed: 26.08.17, Nye, Joseph S. Jr. (2011), The Future of Power, New York, Nye, Joseph S. Jr. (2011), Macht im 21sten Jahrhundert. Politische Strategien für ein neues Zeitalter, München, Rodham Clinton, Hillary (2010), Leading Through Civilan Power. Redefining American Diplomacy and Development, in: Foreign Affairs, November/December 2010, Vol. 89, No.6, S. 13-24.